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First as Speculation  




This paper engages with Todd McGowan’s Emancipation after Hegel by 
changing the perspective regarding the role that contradiction plays in cultivating 
emancipatory praxis; a curiously novel endeavor, which is to be considered an 
offspring of the German idealistic tradition, having Hegel as its procreator. Here, my 
intention is not to indicate an inherent problem with this premise, but to think through 
an impasse that is embedded in the bowels of dialectical thinking. While McGowan 
is adamantly advocating contradiction in the name of emancipation, there is an 
imposing realm left untouched if abridged to just this. As a (ontological) deadlock, 
emancipation has to be thought as immanently tied to language, which is in Hegel’s 
mind the purest speculative form. Furthermore, in contrast to the contemporary use 
of speculation as a financial practice, Hegel regards the commitment to a 
speculative spirit as thinking in the terms of a life worth less than meaning. It is at this 
conjuncture that I, on one hand, accordingly aim to broaden the debate on 
emancipation through an unfolding of the framework of contradiction itself, and on 
the other, to distill the process according to which language is able to form thoughts 
from empty words. 
 
1. To (not) contradict is to err 
Is it possible to deduce an elemental cornerstone emancipatory potential in 
Hegel’s philosophy that wouldn’t merely solidify his legacy as being on the right side 
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of history and neither stand merely as a beacon of hope, but put forth a systematic 
strategy for emancipatory politics? Numerous interpretations, if not even the majority 
of readings of Hegel are either perfunctory or generalized, where Hegel himself 
probably as culpable as the interpreters. Using dialectics as a philosophical 
paradigm, while misunderstood the basic premise is not a good prospect for political 
action. And while McGowan did not succumb to any dialectical traps, accomplishing 
to outline a consistent and comprehensive logic behind Hegel’s obscure insistence 
on contradiction, his consistency also produces a certain deadlock. The necessity of 
contradiction itself is not regarded as a contingent phenomenon (the actuality of 
man being ingrained into the shape of his skull-bone). It is necessary to read these 
two parallel ideas together. To read Hegel as a thinker of the impasse, antagonism, 
dichotomy and contradiction is unavoidable and necessary, but to think him as a 
purveyor of emancipation is a radical premise that is worthy to revisit. 
Having such a lofty issue at hand, it is essential to stress that the knowledge 
regarding contradiction as our object of analysis can structurally be only non-
subjective. Meaning that by posing a question concerning truth, the subject 
endeavors to gain suitable knowledge, but in striving to attain an adequate picture of 
contradiction itself, things can only get more complicated. Since the present object 
of knowledge is not simply a thing in the external world, but a logical determination, 
any query regarding truth will inevitably produce a self-referential differentiation. Any 
attempt to appropriate truth in its bare form despair, since every time that truth is at 
our fingertips it slips away and we are left with a fistful of nothing. Such an 
impossible drive for substantial reality can’t be resolved by adjusting the approach 
until the right measure can be found. On the contrary, this stuttering posture of truth 
turns out to be the truth itself and thus the sought-after knowledge. A failure of 
anticipated result has to occur to establish as a by-product the true outcome. The 
difference between the principled fostering of adequation and rational sublation of 
truth is immanently tied to a change of perspective of what dialectics is trying to 
establish. When contradiction is regarded as a starting obstacle1 in need of a 
resolution, the furthest we can arrive to are Kant’s antinomies, for example, to 
ascertain the problem of free will in relation to necessity, which arise when we apply 
categories that overstep our finite knowledge. Conversely, contradiction is absolved 
of such limitations by introducing an ontological negation, let say, into the 
antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Contradiction is their 
common denominator and thus acts as the constitutive principle of society. Hence, 
the ironic queries, tea or coffee, yes, please (or, freedom or terror, yes, please), do not 
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undermine the opposition of elements, but instead, by inserting a contradiction, offset 
the preordained meaning and offer a different significance. This kind of tension is not 
a disturbance, but an immanent principle, whereby, “a dialectical advance, as Hegel 
conceives it, is a step in the direction of absolute contradiction, not a progressive 
movement toward the elimination of contradiction.” (McGowan, 2019: 21) After Marx, 
it is almost impossible to rescind such a postulation. 
 Irreducible contradiction is therefore “not a way of not knowing but a way of 
knowing, the way of knowing that Hegel associates with reason.” (Ibid: 61) The whole 
process is namely inseparable from thought itself, more specifically, from reason 
(Vernunft), which has anatomically a contradictory stature. But there is a question 
that remains. Why is thought the vehicle of contradiction? Perhaps the simplest 
answer is also the most obvious one. By having the insight about the impossibility to 
think a beginning without falling into contradiction, a premise that is since Kant 
unavoidable, insomuch as an impossibility must be inscribed into being itself. If such 
an impasse “weren’t possible, obviously, we couldn’t even think it,” (Ibid., 96) an 
argumentation that is further expounded with the conclusion that thought, “has the 
ability to reconcile itself to contradiction. (Ibid: 97) However, merely making a claim 
without any justification is a halfway measure or a romantically infused definition, 
since it still neutralizes thought. 
Each direct approach to understanding contradiction will result in a similar 
failure, so a different outlook is needed to grasp its inner workings. We’re namely 
dealing with what Adorno named, “a hardened scar (die verhärtete Narbe) of an 
unresolved problem” (Adorno, 1974: 11) that doesn’t just testify to courageous efforts, 
but continuously reminds us of their failed nature. In this incrusted and inert form, the 
repetitive confrontation with it nevertheless produces conceptual vitality, as the 
repeated attempts do not indicate the same identical matter, but to a greater extent 
the practice of reproduction.2 Contradiction itself3 is best exemplified in the notion of 
concept (Begriff) as Hegel defined it. It is superfluous to mention that a concept does 
not facilitate a subjective stance that is in accordance with a perceived object. There 
is namely no trace of Platonism in this idea, but neither is it useful for grasping the 
Kantian thing-itself. Both of these seek to grab some sort of solid core of meaning. 
Hegel was never overly interested in this. On the contrary, the advent of concept was 
premeditated on a predicament; how to signify something that doesn’t refer to 
anything while at the same time actively intervening into the world by imposing 
some sort of rule. Hegel was namely interested in the manner in which truth begets 
its form, which he accomplished by marking a constitutive empty frame of meaning. 
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The Hegelian subject has a constitutive stipulation and can only appease it by 
surrendering himself to the “absolute suffering” of thinking, in which he has to 
persevere to the very breaking point of thought. While he gains nothing, this nothing 
is not the last word, since thinking has to continue, thus the Hegelian subject must 
retain this agony as a positive experience. In brief, the subject is established by 
contact with the lack of meaning, when touching (greifen) the lack of real being 
simultaneously produces comprehension (begreifen). While initially the purpose may 
be to discern the truth of a determinate object, it quickly becomes clear that the 
object of comprehension cannot be identical with itself, since the approach itself 
changes the initial object. The insight into the discrepancy of the object with itself is 
Begriff. 
But, work needs to be done to achieve this, a dialectical grind. There is a 
persistent idea that Hegel has a common-sense strategy in mind when using the 
dialectical method. Positing a thesis, positive declaration (fascism is in an 
authoritarian reign of the word that enchanted the population), which has to have its 
own antithesis (fascism is a consistent practice of subordinating state economy to 
capital needs), while their contradiction is sublated (Aufgehoben) in a synthesis of 
both (certain aspects of both rationales define fascism). At the same time, it was 
never intended to be a method for resolving disputes by consensus. Such a rough 
and improper reading can’t be found in any of Hegel’s work, although some 
ambiguous wording on his part, such as the restitution of identity, may have misled 
the early readers and contributed to this logical derivation. If we need to refer to such 
a ménage à trois of theses, where none is neglected, then the dialectical reversal has 
to be perceived as a renunciation of the starting position. Consequently, thesis and 
antithesis lose their common ground, as the synthesis is to release antithesis from 
the context of thesis. 
Dialectic is commonly regarded as an external and negative activity which 
does not belong to the thing itself but is rooted in mere conceit, in a subjective 
obsession for subverting and bringing to naught everything firm and true, or at 
least as in resulting in nothing but the vanity of the subject matter subjected to 
dialectical treatment. (Hegel, 2010b: 35) 
There is no amicable return to a simple, transparent idea of fascism, since the 
synthetic conclusion is to give a voice to antithesis, free of the thesis. Synthesis thus 
functions as an emancipation of structural necessities or simply a “change of 
perspective”. And it is paramount to understand this change of perspective to 
understand the inner working of contradiction. At all cost should the reasoning that 
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the principle drive lays in removing a divide between two excluding positions be 
dismiss. This shift of perspective is more aligned with Hegel’s idea of reconciliation 
(Versöhnung). As clearly emphasized by McGowan, “through the act of reconciliation, 
thought adopts a relationship to contradiction that being cannot attain. It doesn’t 
overcome contradiction but grasps its necessity.” (2019: 97) This irreducibility of 
contradiction ties dialectics into the differentiation of reason (Vernunft) from 
understanding (Verständ). 
2. Dialectics without speculations 
While reason is the preferred form of thinking and internalizing contradiction, it is 
necessary to emphasize that understanding or “non-speculative thinking also has its 
right” (Hegel, 2018: 40), because reason is simply understanding brought to its logical 
conclusion. Hence, reason shouldn’t be regarded as an exclusive or even private 
practice that preclude its use from certain human beings, as it is, on the contrary, 
available to “anyone at whichever level of education and mental development they 
may find themselves.” (Hegel, 2010a: 132) To take understanding seriously means 
having the capacity to think contradiction, or more specifically, reason “can only 
define itself on the basis of its antagonism to understanding.” (Simoniti, 2018: 228) 
The realm of reason is predicated on dialectical procedure, but for all intents and 
purposes it also encompasses the effects of the speculative force. We have to be 
aware that there are two principals at work. 
A dialectic maneuver is not synonymous with speculation.4 Hegel himself is 
clear about that. In Encyclopedia, he minutely unfolds the structure of his logic, and 
in doing so outlines three equally relevant sides: “abstract side or that of the 
understanding (Verständige),” (Hegel, 2010aL: 125) which we briefly addressed and 
contextualized above; “dialectical or negatively rational” (ibid.), reconciliatory 
mechanism that we looked at in detail and “the speculative or positively rational” 
(Ibid.). The latter is of particular interest, as it unfolds the form of contradiction into a 
new field, however, there is no set logical order, where one side is privileged over 
another. But to uphold the truth of an arbitrary concept, let us consider for instance 
the economic category of capital as a convenient one, is essential to keep the triad 
intact. 
With understanding, a thought determination of an existent phenomena 
against others is made. This would suggest that in capitalism, capital appears as a 
universal constant that relies on its opposite in the form of communism, whereby it 
establishes its own particular distinctness or identity among all others – hardly an 
acceptable definition that would do the contemporary maxim justice. However, in 
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practice, it is impossible to circumvent such determinations, given that things have to 
be seen in isolation to be made suitable to use. As already mentioned, understanding 
has it’s “rights and its merits” (Ibid: 126) and shouldn’t be viewed as a redundant clog 
in the struggle to grasp speculative truths. Incidentally, Goethe’s advice to know how 
to limit ourselves and not want everything was certainly not a wisdom uttered in 
passing. This is especially evident in professions, which must be pursued with 
understanding. The familiarity with work tasks has to be upheld.  
Understanding capital simply as a collection of wealth or other assets for 
purpose of spending or investing may be narrow-minded, since it is necessarily 
missing the contradiction that will lead to its fall. But it is also obvious that human 
proceedings are structured around such an understanding of capital. This first 
position is directly contrasted by Marx’s analysis, according to which capital is “not a 
thing”, but has to be regarded as a “definite social relation […] which is manifested in 
a thing and provides this thing a specific social character.” (Marx, 2004: 789)5 Thereby 
the means of production and all other kinds of commodities in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie are made into the means of exploitation of the workers. How to show 
this turn inward? Critique of commodity fetishism tries to achieve just that, establish 
the right conditions under which it would be conceivable to comprehend the error 
embedded into commodity fetishism.  
A familiar, but limited understanding of a notion, in our case capital, denoting 
an asset capable of generating an income stream for its owner, logically has to 
transition into its opposite. Capital itself, by valorizing assets, conditions the inversion 
of the perspective. Suddenly, the same capital is “dead labour, that, vampire-like, only 
lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks. The time 
during which the labourer works, is the time during which the capitalist consumes 
the labour-power he has purchased of him.” (Marx, 1991: 209) Conceived in this way, 
the moment when the thesis is sublated into the opposite is also the moment that 
dialectical movement is introduced. At first, seen from the perspective of 
understanding, the dialectical contains mere negation, but in reality, it unfolds “the 
proper, true nature of the determinations of the understanding, of things” (Hegel, 
2010a, 128) by going “beyond [such determinacy].” (Ibid: 129) In Marxist context, the 
worker isn’t endowed with privileged knowledge regarding his being or with the idea 
of an ultimate emancipatory goal that will help him see the exploitive underbelly of 
capital. The worker achieves to invert the form of understanding capital through 
“what he is forced to do historically, in accordance with his being.” (Marx, 1920: 80) 
Hegel would add, “wherein the one-sided and limited character of the 
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determinations of the understanding” of capital “presents itself as what it is, namely 
as their negation.” (2010a: 128) To be a worker therefore entails the demand to 
separate oneself from oneself, to instill a difference between me and myself. We can 
say that a worker becomes alienated (Entfremdung), but has to reconcile himself 
with such a prediction together with all the implications. 
If work needs to be done by the worker, the dialectical principle brings to light 
the internal impulse that motivates the actual activity. The limitation of a notion of 
work isn’t merely externally imposed, but also promulgated from within. For example, 
while free circulation of capitalist goods is believed to be beneficial to the well-being 
of the populous, its negative byproducts are brushed aside as something extraneous. 
We would have missed the point if we thought that the dialectical turn was about a 
transition from a false definition to a more suitable, truer one. Capital is infused with 
two particular characteristics that seems separate, a productive principle of society 
and its downfall; however, their contradictory nature is a reflection of the abstract 
determination.6 The finite properties of capital contradict themselves in themselves, 
which is the reason that there are no compromises between them. Consequently, 
their meeting can only result in their sublation. This is why the commonsense 
understanding of capital is one-sided and limited, but is not wrong. The manner in 
which it presents itself renders it possible to turn it over into its opposite; now 
understanding presents itself as what it is, namely as their negation. Does that mean 
that the mere fact of sustaining the knowledge of this contradictory form would 
suffice in changing the parameters of exploitation inherent to the capitalist structure? 
Engels wouldn’t be satisfied with such naive strategy of liberation. 
Economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch 
necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and 
intellectual history of that epoch; [...] consequently (ever since the dissolution 
of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of 
class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between 
dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social development; 
[...] this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and 
oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the 
class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same 
time for ever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and 
class struggles. (Engels, 2002: 197)7 
McGowan might be right to distance himself from the Marxist belief in abolishing 
contradictory nature of capital, in favor of “a substantial future free from 
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contradiction“ (2019: 5), since Hegel himself would endorse such an opinion: “What is 
in play here is already found in all other forms of consciousness and is found 
universally in experience.” (Hegel, 2010a: 130), a position that is only radicalized in 
The Science of Logic, “All things are in themselves contradictory.” (Hegel, 2010b: 381) 
However, it is paramount to appreciate the fine line that Engels is trying to walk here. 
The argumentation is unsurprisingly infused with a dialectical spirit, which means 
that we shouldn’t presume simple answers, such as the “fantasy of a 
noncontradictory alternative.” (McGowan, 2019: 212) Rather, Engels focuses on 
unlatching the sewed together categories (proletariat-bourgeoisie, exploitation-
production), whereby work and oppression isn’t naturally embedded into the 
structuring principle of society. In this manner, the loss of capital as an exploitative 
structure wouldn’t be naturally regarded as means of accumulating wealth.8 The 
essence of both meanings is not sublated into an inseparable identity, since the 
sublation establishes a non-relationship ‒ to think proletariat and bourgeoisie 
together isn’t predicated on a neutral frame of reference from which it would be 
possible to discern a political and economical solution, since both are inseparably 
tangled together, functioning only in the heart of the other. 
This insight into the logic of antagonism shows that even in a completely 
automated society, the real adversary is the formal relationship at hand and the way 
in which contradiction structures societal life, operating as the principle that forms 
society. We will not contest the individual depictions (of capital) that are 
interdependent by each other, since they have their claim to describe and reflect the 
true state of things. It is only by experiencing a sort of distance and separation from 
such an appearance and in its place bring forth the nonsensical and inconsistent 
elements that hold them together, are we able to see what is produced in their 
encounter. As Marx put it, this is the “solution” that is present in the material 
conditions, the addition that magnetizes the field around it. Despite having the key to 
think contradiction at arm’s length, neither Marx nor Engels were faithful to this 
premise.  
In the last instance, the inherent contradiction is expressed through the emptying 
of meaning9, since every idea resides primarily on the premise of understanding, 
which fixates relations between things and thoughts without leaving any negative 
remainder. The most noteworthy example of such a constitutive paradox came 
about when Hegel travelled to the Alps; he stared at the dead endless masses and 
simply exclaimed, “Es ist so (It is so).” No grand meanings, sublime things or truth, 
just mere presence, expressed as a negative foundation, which needs to be filled in 
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with practical activity by providing reality with a retainer. Absence of meaning 
together with the exposition of antagonism embody a twofold foundation that forms 
what we have defined as Hegel’s concept (Begriff). By separating the subject from 
itself, contradiction and meaninglessness produce alienation, but alienation that is 
manifested exclusively in language, which appears here in its characteristic form of 
concept. The concept itself namely extends through the thing (Sache) and language 
(Sprache) and let us not forget that language is for Hegel the highest form of the 
speculative spirit. 
3. From contradiction to language and back 
With understanding and dialectics, we have drawn up two edges of logic leaving 
us to take a closer look at the third side, the prospect of speculation. A modern 
reading of speculation is almost impossible to not associate with the specifically 
risky, but at times profitable financial activity, however, Hegel’s time had a similar 
predicament as the notion was “used in a very vague and at the same time 
subordinate sense, as, for instance, when one speaks of speculations concerning 
marriage or commerce.” (Hegel, 2010a: 132) Both adoptions have much more to do 
with Hegel's use of speculation than it may seem at first glance. All of the examples 
given namely reveal how the immediacy of the presented content passes into its 
otherness. Marriage based on love quickly turns into a formal expression of assorted 
rights and obligations. Commerce, as one of the “antediluvian forms of capital” (Marx, 
1991: 150), is obviously the exchange of goods and services, but such a definite 
determination excludes the fact that slave trading was principally the most profitable 
of commerce enterprises. These particular opposite, one-sided determinations 
express a logical contradiction of the things as they are in and for themselves. While 
commonsense convictions would assert that such contradictions reflect the 
incompatibility of particular properties, they overlook that their very existence is 
predicated on them. 
Speculative thought consists only in this, in holding firm to contradiction and to 
itself in the contradiction, but not in the sense that, as it happens in ordinary 
thought, it would let itself be ruled by it and allow it to dissolve its 
determinations into just other determinations or into nothing. (Hegel, 2010b: 
383) 
What the speculative inference fills out is the empty shell of a thing that is left 
after the dialectical procedure. Speculation namely insists in such a thing emptied of 
sensuous content and external referent, since the “empty, abstract nothing” is in 
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reality a result of “negation of definite determinations” (Hegel, 2010a: 132), which 
means, an integration of the opposites into a unified concrete thought, while also 
preserving the “ideal moments within itself” (Ibid: 133). By reiterating the thought 
determinations, speculation opens up the possibilities of thought. Even though the 
dialectical movement produces its own positive product in the form of “the negation 
of definite determinations” (Ibid.), which transition into their opposites, speculation 
encompasses the leftovers of this operation as something affirmative, a shift into 
something else, a change that brings about something new.  
Here it seems that a more graspable emancipatory technique is already at 
hand. But while speculation can be regarded as a rational force that “makes the 
night of reason from noon of understanding” (Simoniti, 2008: 71), thereby establishing 
a form of thinking that oscillates between two opposing nothing, which allows 
thought determinations to be written anew, an essential aspect of speculation 
moment is present somewhere else. Just as importantly, as hollowing out of 
meaning is Hegel’s specific reasoning, according to which thought arises from 
naming: “it is in names that we think10.” (Hegel, 1979: 278) What Hegel is referring to is 
a peculiar consideration on the provenance and imposition of thought. Thoughts are 
present to us only when we imprint into them the form of objectivity distinguished 
from the inwardness, “that is, the form of externality, and of such an externality, which 
at the same time is wearing the stamp of the highest inwardness. Such an inward 
externality is by itself the articulated tone, the word.” (Ibid: 280) To think without 
words is namely unreason(able). According to Hegel, such a stance can only lead to 
insanity, while words “give thoughts their most dignified and true existence11.” (Ibid.) 
The more that we grasp words, familiarize ourselves with them, the more their 
objectivity and meaning fade away, leaving subjectivity as an empty container for 
words that can externalize thoughts. Such a radical reading, where though can 
persevere only through words that are resolved of meaning, is also the reason why 
Hegel defined speculation in the following manner: “the dialectical movement […] is 
the actual speculation, and only the enunciation (Aussprechen) of this movement is 
the speculative exposition.” (Hegel, 2018: 40) Obviously, Hegel held language in high 
regard, considered it to be the only actual speculation, however the first instinct is 
that thinking emerges from a more personalized apprehension. 
Phenomenology of Spirit may begin with a plethora of various sensory 
certainties, which introduces us to the immediacy of the present. But their presence 
does not enable distinction to accumulate, neither is there room for subjectivity or 
identity to prevail, since it only functions as a phantasmatic arche-scene. Sensible 
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experience is not a fundamental precondition for the work of conceptualization to 
commence. Even more damning, Hegel regards those who insist in it to “trample the 
roots of humanity underfoot.” (2008: 65) To do the latter is to be solely bound to a 
particular stance, which is to stand firm with the meaning we mean. This is why 
Hegel puts forth an option, in the form of a contradiction, between what we mean 
and what we say. 
However, as we see, language is the more truthful. In language, we 
immediately refute what we mean to say, and since the universal is the truth of 
sensuous-certainty, and language only expresses this truth, it is, in that way, 
not possible at all that we could ever say what we mean about sensuous 
being. (Hegel, 2018: 43)  
 
The role of an emancipatory principle is therefore entrusted to language, since 
it is language that conditions the sense apparatus to be receptive to externality of the 
world in the first place and not the other way around. Furthermore, to be able to 
touch the otherness of itself, it is obligatory to be first embroiled in language. 
 
But language enables man to conceive of things as general, to attain the 
consciousness of his own universality, to express (Aussprechen) the I. This 
comprehension of his selfhood is a most important point of the child’s spiritual 
development; with this point, it begins to reflect itself from a state of immersion 
(Versenktsein) into the outside world. (Hegel, 1979: 80) 
 
This is to say, language isn’t a medium of direct representation; it is even less a 
bridge beyond appearances; however, it also doesn’t discern an adequate picture of 
reality or truth. It is more so the trigger that configures the difference between me 
and myself, but it is also what is common to these positions. Language, in other 
words, animates contradiction. The above passage is nevertheless not definite, as it 
allows several alternative interpretations. For instance, Gramsci assigned a central 
role to language, as a “totality of determined notions and concepts” (1992: 323), in the 
conceptualization of hegemony; altogether opposite reasoning can be found in 
Graeser, who advocates the possibility to “wordlessly invoke the immediacy of 
relationship of knowledge” (2006: 49); Jameson offers an intriguing insight, 
understanding language “as an index of error or contradiction,” (2010: 35) while 
disregarding a positive account of language in Encyclopedia as simplistic, endowed 
with an “Aristotelian spirit” and thus not really worthwhile for further analysis. But he 
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invested a particular interest in the alienating (Entfremdung) effects of language that 
are explicated especially in Phenomenology of Spirit in the chapter on The World of 
Self-alienated Spirit, an essential characteristic to which we will return shortly. 
When humanity is at stake, it is sufficient to understand language as 
“communality of consciousness” (Gemeinsamkeit der Bewußtsein) (Hegel, 2008: 65), 
but the perspective on the immediate use of language is of no interest to Jameson. 
The moment when the first mumbled syllables emerge, a child has already 
transgressed the principle of non-contradiction. The structure of language takes care 
that the universal aspect of communality trumps over individual caprices. The 
speaking being becomes himself by enunciating and thereby surrendering to the 
universality of language. This occurs as an emptying (kenosis, Entäußerung) of 
himself, of meaning, but in particular, of his own structural place. It is nothing else, 
but the conservation of this contradiction. Such an ordeal of emptying isn’t 
superseded by a “replenishing with practical activity” (Simoniti, 2008: 48), which is “in 
itself indifferent” (Hegel, 2008: 595). A universalization of self, a knowing and willing 
self that is only “actual in language.” (ibid.) The result is at first perplexing and 
probably still best elaborated through Epistle to the Philippians: "But he emptied 
himself, taking the form of a slave, becoming as human beings are" (2:7 NJB). Not 
without reason, the master (Herr) and slave (Knecht), or more precisely, servant 
(Knecht)12 dialectic comes to mind. And Hegel was unequivocally here, stating that “it 
is the conquered, rather than the conqueror, who is right.” (McGowan, 2019: 171) 
Portraying the role of slave means the opposite of the usual interpretation, according 
to which the slave simply subordinates himself to the master. In short, while the 
immovable master, attached to some “specific determinate being” (Hegel, 2018: 111), 
is prepared to sacrifice everything for his honor, even himself, the compliant slave is 
prepared to do even that – sacrifice all, the “being-in-itself” including the name, and 
still live on.13 Only by yielding, is the slave able to express forgiveness to the master, 
since “forgiveness […] is the renunciation of itself, of its unreal essential being […]; or 
rather it abandons this distinction of the specific thought and its subjectively 
determined judgement, just as the other abandons its subjective characterization of 
action.” (Ibid: 387-388) 
The true sacrifice is thus the sacrifice of being-for-itself, “sacrificing itself just as 
completely, as it does in death” and with this radical emancipatory act achieving that 
“the self as such a self, thereby steps forward and alienates itself.” (Ibid: 294) Going 
back to the topic of alienation, we have already made it clear that alienation emerges 
exclusively in language,  
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“for language is the existence of the pure self as the self […] so that it is for 
others. […] The I that expresses itself is brought to a hearing […] In its being 
brought to a hearing, its existence has itself immediately become fainter. This, 
its otherness, is taken back into itself, and its existence is just this: as a self-
conscious now, as it is there, it is not there, and through this disappearance, it 
is there. This disappearing itself is thus immediately its 
lasting.” (Ibid.) 
This insistence in language is the speculative act as such. In contrast to the 
prevailing idea that only a particular act can bring forth the transformation of reality, it 
the practice of speculative thinking that incites newness, which occurs at the 
moment of declaration. A question remains: a declaration of what? In contrast to the 
everyday reading, according to which language serves the conformity of concept 
and thing, Hegel encompasses the ontological scope of the contradictory nature of 
language in its expressive form. For example, the figure of Hegel is inseparably tied 
to his famous nightcap. This coincidental headdress sprouted the image of a 
philosopher of the nightfall, from the owl of Minerva that takes its flight only when the 
shades of night are gathering to the famous eyes of the subject in which we can see 
the night of the world. Alienation in this contingent object resulted in the de-
particularization, emptying of Hegel the subject. However, it was Heine’s 
performative act present in his Book of Poems14 that split (Entzweiung) Hegel from 
himself and bound him to the above-mentioned new referent. It is thus in such 
encounters of contingency and performative that we get the speculative mandate to 
interfere and reshape being. 
4. Emancipation with(out) speculation 
While McGowan expresses the idea according to which “emancipation […] occurs 
through contradiction, not as a result of its overcoming,” (2019: 213) our reasoning 
deviates from such absolutist notion. Striving for emancipation shouldn’t be reduced 
to simply affirming absolute knowledge as our last horizon, “accepting contradiction 
as an internal condition of every identity.” (Ibid: 55). While it is necessary to 
encompass the principle that “alienated unity”, especially the state, holds individual 
subjects together “through a shared way of being what they are not,” (Ibid: 203) in the 
last instance that would also encompass Marx’s interpretation of capitalism as an 
antagonistic mode of production. If we don’t want to deprive emancipation of the 
radical demand for a self-determined separation, a slightly different perspective is 
necessary. 
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Emancipation is generally identified with releasing a person into self-
determination: declared for independent, free and endued with equal rights. An 
explanation unmistakably present in the name of the Proclamation 95, The 
Proclamation of Emancipation, a war measure issued during the American Civil War 
by the president of the United States, declaring all persons held as slaves to be from 
then on free. But interestingly, emancipation is a composition ēx manus capere 
(detach from the hand), to establish a divide, a separation from something. From 
what and for what? Not just from despotism of the other, but more so a separation 
from ourselves. This rationale is interestingly etymologically inscribed into the notion 
of emancipation. The Latin word emancipō namely signifies emancipation as well as 
alienation. We have seen that such separation from ourselves is actually the 
common ground, which bands us together with others. 
As already noted, the grabbing (greiffen) in the concept (Begriff) is not Hegel’s 
trick to establish a meaningful representational framework, but a “life pulse” (2010b: 
17) for thought that binds it to the nullity of meaning and otherness. It is the principle 
that animates thought, but importantly also an instrument for upholding our 
understanding, manifested in the ordinary consciousness. It has all the empirical 
wealth of the world except the blindness covers up the constitutive deficit inherent to 
conceptual thinking. It shouldn’t be surprising that in the unlikely partnership 
between master and slave, we characterized the latter as an emancipatory figure, 
however, it is likewise essential to take into consideration the gain on both sides. 
While the master, being merely himself, has all the interesting ideas and witty 
remarks, understands everything, but doesn’t think. Unknowingly to the master, the 
servant takes on the task of thinking, which requires work. Firstly, fearing for his life at 
the hands of the master, the servant abandoned his own self-sufficiency and 
autonomy. However, by experiencing this dread, he also gains a positive lesson in 
self-determination. By going through the void of fixed, determinate and stable things, 
the slave was able to freely give up the struggle with the master and win 
independence. The thin ideological line between knowing that the history is on our 
side and knowing that the world itself is contingent is the ability to commit ourselves 
to the freedom of thought.   
Emancipation through speculation proceeds by disenchanting the world, 
which we said is essentially the disenchantment of its meaning. What is then the 
strategy for emancipatory action? Just as it is a “delight for thought” that language 
can produce words that carry “not just different meanings, but opposite ones” (Hegel, 
2010b, 12), the common societal sphere must cultivate delights for the speculative 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






spirit that don’t need to be novel to thought. But let us take a more basic, linguistic 
example of homophones. These are words that are pronounced in the same 
manner, but have a different, contradictory meaning. While reason and raisin may 
seem foreign, in essence, the spoken word is identical. By separating themselves 
from permanent significance, such words are able to stay faithful to themselves 
through utterance: “The word in its wordhood unfurls a new, irreducible dimension 
even with regard to language as a whole.” (Simoniti, 2018: 228) As is true for 
language, emancipation also requires work, conceptual work. If we don’t want 
emancipation to be pure self-referring differentiation, leaving us with a de-
substantialized hollowed out subject, we need a mandate for a rational 
emancipation while simultaneously preserving understanding as the point of 
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1 Every start can only be inadequate, an error in judgement, since truth itself is the universal medium in 
which truth and knowledge are calibrating their accord. But this failure is already handling with the 
thing itself and thus the truth about which we inquired. Hegel’s introduction to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit exhaustively deals with this paradoxical requirement of philosophical inquiry to start with the 
truth itself. 
2 In this mechanism, it is possible to discern the inner structure of capitalist reproduction, whereby 
capital has to pass through a paradoxical point at which the role of capitalist and worker becomes 
inverted. The latter have to contribute as much as the capitalist, since any surplus value can be 
realized only with the help of the workers themselves, by acquiring their own produced items: 
“consumption, which is conceived not only as a terminal point, but also as an end-in-itself, actually 
belongs outside economics except in so far as it reacts in tum upon the point of departure and 
initiates the whole process anew.” (Marx, 1993: 89) A contradictory relationship that is self-fecundating. 
The side of consumerism therefore seems very suitable for proletarian interventions; however, any 
thoughtless impetus, which is always present in such situations, may quickly change into illusion 
according to which that it is possible to expel antagonism as such from society. 
3 In Lacan's imaginarium, the phenomena of contradiction is exemplified by the axiom “there is no 
sexual relationship.” 
4 While Hegel’s idea of speculation isn’t synonyms with dialectics, the same cannot be said of 
mysticism. This mystical character shouldn’t be regarded as something unthinkable and 
incomprehensible, but mystical in the sense of going beyond mere understanding. 
5 Just to avoid misunderstandings, capital itself is not synonyms with exploitation, and neither is capital 
an all-encompassing principle. Marx clearly understood this: “a cotton-spinning machine is a machine 
for spinning cotton.” Only under certain conditions does it become capital. Torn away from these 
conditions, it is as little capital as gold by itself is money, or as sugar is the price of sugar. (2006: 28) 
6 Hegel describes the emergence of contradiction in the following manner: “the self-subsisting 
determination of reflection excludes the other in the same respect as it contains it and is self-
subsisting for precisely this reason, in its self-subsistence the determination excludes its own self-
subsistence from itself. For this self-subsistence consists in that it contains the determination which is 
other than it in itself and does not refer to anything external for just this reason; but no less 
immediately in that it is itself and excludes from itself the determination that negates it. And so it is 
contradiction.” (2010b: 374) 
7 Engels continued his thought by attributing this “basic thought” to Marx who deduced a more radical 
alternative as a simple non-contradictory future: “Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as 
it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when 
the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.” (1970: 
21) 
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8 An emancipatory portrayal of wealth can be discerned in Saint Paul’s universalism: “Let no man seek 
his own, but every man another's wealth.” (1 Cor 10:24 KJB) Wealth of a man is not expressed through 
himself, but by virtue of committing to the community and the commons. 
9 Hegel uses a reading of skepticism, which doesn't equate skeptical outlook with the insistence to 
doubt, but rather the insight into “the nothingness of all things finite.” (2010a, 131) To be consistently 
doubtful just means that such an individual is led by a consistent fantasy of a true and stable 
fundament at the end of the path. On the contrary, as a skeptic it is necessary to surrender to despair, 
to despair about everything that is firm in understanding. 
10 An identical reasoning can be found in Hegel's The Science of Logic: “The forms of thought are first 
set out and stored in human language.” (2010b: 12) 
11 This doesn't predicate that in every occasion when words are exchanged, we can be calmly 
characterized as rational. More often than not, words are used without grasping the matter. But Hegel 
doesn't put the blame for this on words, but unreasonables of inane and stolid thinking. 
12 The interpretations around the participants in Hegel's quintessential dialectical relationship is still a 
matter of dispute, however, the relationship between lord and bondsman has become well-
established. It is of course questionable to argue for the term slave as a proper translation of Knecht, 
since Hegel himself uses Sklave or slave to differentiate the modern phenomena from Roman role of 
slave, who is legally cannot be regarded as man. In Philosophy of Right, Hegel is very clear: “very 
status of slave indeed is an outrage on the conception of man,” as such opposes free will and is 
entrapped at the level of mere consciousness. Only by encountering each other, do the master and 
bondsman establish the conditions for freedom to emerge. A convincing argument for the use of 
lordship and bondage can be found in Cole, Andrew (2014), The Birth of Theory, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. Nonetheless, a claim in favor of slavery has validity, since Hegel’s motive 
is clearly to present the “general relation of domination and subordination” and not “to search for a 
determinate historical reference.” (Kobe, 2015:842) Such a reading is exemplary presented in Ottmann, 
Henning (1982), Herr und Knecht bei Hegel. Bemerkungen zu einer mißverstandenen Dialektik, 
Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 35 (3/4), and Kobe, Zdravko (2015), True Sacrifice. On 
Hegel’s Presentation of Self-Consciousness, Filozofija I društvo XXVI (4). 
13 “The true sacrifice of being-for-itself is thus solely that in which it surrenders itself as completely as in 
death, yet in this renunciation it no less preserves itself.” (Hegel, 2018: 294) 
14 The well know verse goes as follows: “With nightcap and dressing-gown scraps for material. He 
chinks up the holes in the universe.” See Heinrich Heine (1972), Werke und Briefe in zehn Bänden. 
Band 1, Berlin und Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag:133. 
